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Abstract 
Retail traffic is one of the main drivers for the growth of intermodal transport services in the UK. 
The aim of this paper is to understand the key factors underpinning this modal shift in order to learn 
lessons for other market and geographical contexts. 
 
Successful retail intermodal logistics involves many actors, thus this paper is based on semi-
structured interviews with major retailers, third-party logistics providers (3PLs) and rail operators, 
supplemented by document analysis. The qualitative data are analysed via a conceptual framework 
derived from the literature. 
 
Despite past successes and the presence of drivers for future growth, the paper identifies many 
operational issues without current solutions and the presence of ongoing public subsidy. The major 
conclusion is that the importance of 3PLs, aggregation and multi-user platforms must be recognised 
by transport planners in supporting the use of intermodal transport by retailers and other large 
shippers. 
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1. Introduction 
The objective of this study is to understand the key factors relating to the use of intermodal 
transport by retailers. The paper thus joins the fields of supply chain, logistics and business 
management with the transportation literature. Successful retail intermodal logistics involves many 
actors, thus this paper addresses the retailers themselves as well as rail operators and third-party 
logistics providers (3PLs). 
Retail traffic is one of the key drivers of intermodal transport in the UK. Lessons learned from 
this success may contribute to an understanding of modal shift in other market or geographical 
contexts. The need for this understanding derives from a policy background over the last decade in 
which modal shift from road to rail has been encouraged by governments as one way to reduce 
carbon emissions (DETR, 1998; European Commission, 2001). While understanding all factors 
involved in successful modal shift is beyond the scope of one paper, this paper will examine the 
particular success of large UK retailers to determine what can be learned for other sectors, and in 
particular what insights can be provided for transport planners in their ongoing work to support 
intermodal transport growth. 
Woodburn (2012) called for interviews with retailers to understand the reasons behind observed 
trends, as well as an examination of the role of port-hinterland flows in relation to domestic 
intermodal routes. This paper addresses that call by examining the overlap between rail industry 
operational issues and the particular needs of the retail market. The paper takes a particular focus on 
the Anglo-Scottish route as it is the key corridor for these movements, providing the distance and 
concentration of flows required. Imports through ports are also considered as rail operators manage 
both port and domestic flows thus the economic feasibility and operational quality of domestic retail 
flows can be affected by these movements. 
The paper begins with a literature review covering the key issues relating to the shift to 
intermodal transport, the growth of intermodal transport in the UK and the spatial and operational 
development of the British retail sector. Section three establishes the conceptual framework derived 
from this literature, extending the recent work by Eng-Larsson & Kohn (2012), followed by the 
methodology. Findings are then presented in four separate sections. Section nine uses a meta-matrix 
to analyse the key factors from the conceptual framework, determining to what extent known issues 
are represented in the actual case, as well as what new lessons can be learned. These results are then 
discussed before drawing conclusions. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 General issues influencing intermodal transport 
Modal shift from road to rail faces a number of challenges. The customer desires low transit 
time, reliability, flexibility and safety from damage, and it has been suggested that customers do not 
perceive that intermodal transport can provide these (RHA, 2007). There is also an issue of 
visibility of the true cost of rail movements. MDS Transmodal (2002) found that “there are no 
published rates for rail freight charges and rail freight users have only a poor understanding of their 
suppliers’ cost structures as there are dominant operators in the market and little on-rail 
competition” (p.49). 
Break-even estimates for a route that requires no road haulage have been estimated as low as 
around 90km. With a road haul at one end only, the figure is roughly 200km, and if both pre- and 
end-hauls are required, the distance is approximately 450km (MDS Transmodal, 2002). Other 
aspects of intermodal freight transport have been discussed by, among others, Arnold et al. (2004), 
Janic (2007), Caris et al. (2008), Kreutzberger (2008) and Woodburn (2011). Whether or not a 
particular product is suitable for intermodal transport includes such considerations as the lead time 
and size of orders, the value and the physical characteristics of the product. Problems with 
intermodal transport include distance, lack of flexibility, lead time for service development and the 
role of the last mile (Bärthel & Woxenius, 2004; Slack & Vogt, 2007). In addition, high fixed costs 
of rail operators and the requirement to consolidate flows on key routes make profitable service 
development difficult. Setting up a rail service is a complicated task, which is a barrier to 
intermodal growth and also a barrier to market entry for new rail operators (Slack & Vogt, 2007).  
Eng-Larsson & Kohn (2012) found that when making a decision to use intermodal transport, the 
convenience of the purchase was more important than the price. From an operational perspective, 
they found that other supply chain decisions had to be made to incorporate intermodal transport, 
such as increased inventory, extended delivery windows, and improvements in planning and 
ordering due to less flexible departure times. The product characteristics and the flow geography are 
also important, generally requiring non-time-sensitive ambient goods on major consolidated routes. 
Cooperation is needed to achieve economies of scale on certain routes, but research has found 
industry reluctant to pursue such a strategy (Van der Horst & de Langen, 2008). Similarly, a service 
needs to be well-developed before shippers will use it (Van Schijndel and Dinwoodie, 2000). There 
is also a severe inertia in the industry. Runhaar & van der Heijden (2005) found that over a 
proposed ten-year period, even a 50% increase in transport costs would not make producers any 
more likely to relocate their production or distribution facilities. Woodburn (2003) investigated the 
relationship between supply chain structure and potential for modal shift to rail, and found that “for 
rail freight to become a much more serious competitor to road haulage would require considerable 
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restructuring of either the whole logistical operations of companies within supply chains or far-
reaching changes to the capabilities of the rail industry to cope with the demands placed upon it” 
(p.244).  
 
2.2 Intermodal transport in the UK 
The majority of rail freight in the UK has traditionally been bulk, until containers overtook coal 
for the first time in 2010 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. UK freight moved by sector (Source: author, based on ORR figures) 
 
Intermodal transport first developed in Britain as a consequence of the maritime container 
revolution in the 1960s. Distribution centres (DCs) centralised in the Midlands became key cargo 
generators and attractors, and, as any port could service the same hinterland, maritime container 
flows concentrated in the large south-eastern ports. Port-hinterland container services have 
continued to grow in recent years, with a 56% increase in the number of these services between 
1998 and 2011 (Woodburn, 2012). 
Loading gauge restrictions on the UK network is a well-known issue, mostly in northern 
Scotland and on the East Coast Mainline (ECML), which is used when services are diverted from 
the primary north-south freight artery the West Coast Mainline (WCML). This is generally more of 
an issue for maritime containers coming through ports, as these are gradually moving towards a 
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standard of high cube (i.e. 9ft6 height rather than the old standard of 8ft6; Network Rail, 2007; 
Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2014). While the major parts of the network (Felixstowe and Southampton 
to the Midlands and thence to Scotland on the WCML) can now take these containers on standard 
wagons (W10 loading gauge), significant portions can only accommodate them on special low 
wagons (W9 or W8 gauge). Capacity for long-term growth is known to be constrained, and 
container imbalances between north and south have been identified (Network Rail, 2007). 
Figure 2 shows that, while the large deepsea ports export empty containers back to the Far East, 
smaller ports, particularly in the north, are required to import empty containers to fill with exports. 
 
 
Figure 2. Empty container movements through UK ports 2010 (with Felixstowe and Southampton 
truncated) (Source: author, based on DfT, 2011) 
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The container imbalance occurs because northbound imports to Scotland come mostly as 45ft 
pallet-wide road trailers or swap bodies (and now rail containers) as they are retail and other 
movements from DCs in the Midlands, whereas the majority of Scotland’s exports leave as 
20ft/40ft maritime containers either through ports or on rail (Wilmsmeier & Monios, 2013). 
Domestic intermodal traffic took longer than port flows to establish, remaining marginal in 
earlier years and utilised primarily for industrial products. Over the last decade this market has 
grown, primarily due to retail flows, with Asda first using rail in 2003 and Tesco following in 2006. 
These flows are on the Anglo-Scottish corridor (between terminals in the Midlands and central 
Scotland) and intra-Scottish (between central and northern Scotland, primarily representing 
continuations of the flows from the Midlands services). These developments were to some extent 
subsidised by successful use of government funding for intermodal terminals (Woodburn, 2007). 
These flows have been primarily northbound secondary distribution of picked ambient grocery 
loads from retail DCs in the Midlands, back loaded with southbound flows from Scottish suppliers, 
such as soft drinks and spring water (FTA, 2012). Concentration of DCs and intermodal terminals 
in the Midlands and in central Scotland, with suitable distance between them (see Figure 3), 
underpinned a high-density Anglo-Scottish corridor with a short “last mile” between DC and 
intermodal terminal at either end. However, it is not yet clear to what extent rail operators are 
matching the service characteristics of road haulage, to which retailers are accustomed. 
 
2.3 Retail logistics in the UK 
UK retailers employ approximately 3 million people and account for almost 6% of UK GDP 
(Forum for the Future, 2007; Jones et al., 2008). Nearly 83% of the retail market of grocery trade in 
the UK is controlled by five supermarket retailers: Tesco (31%), Asda (17%), Sainsbury (16%), 
Morrison (12%) and the Co-operative (7%) (Scottish Government, 2012). 
 The spatial distribution of the retail sector has evolved over the last few decades from a system 
whereby suppliers delivered directly to stores to the introduction of DCs in the 1970s and 80s to the 
arrival in the 90s of primary consolidation centres (PCCs) (Fernie & McKinnon, 1991; Fernie et al., 
2000; IGD, 2009). Lead times and inventories were greatly reduced as part of impressive efficiency 
advances over this period.  
 While the industry deals with external pressures such as market saturation, competition and 
demographic shifts (Kumar, 2008), a number of operational trends have been observed in the 
literature, such as the centralisation and relocation of plants and distribution centres, reduction in 
the supplier base and consolidation of the carrier base (Fernie & McKinnon, 1991; Lemoine & 
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Skjoett-Larsen, 2004; Abrahamsson & Brege, 1997; O’Laughlin et al., 1993). Market power has 
also been concentrated among a few large retailers due to mergers and acquisitions (Burt & Sparks, 
2003). Distribution centres are being optimised and new purpose-built facilities are appearing. 
Figure 3 illustrates the location of the distribution centres for the five major grocery retailers in the 
UK (PCCs are not shown). The centralisation in the Midlands is clear, as is the lack of coverage in 
north England, north Scotland and Wales. 
 
 
Figure 3. UK distribution centres of the top five supermarket retailers 
(Source: author, based on data obtained from retailer websites) 
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This paper will look primarily at the Anglo-Scottish movements from DCs in the Midlands to 
Scotland, as representative of both successful intermodal transport and trends towards greater 
centralisation. However, port flows will also be considered, as some discussion of locating import-
focused distribution centres at ports has taken place in recent years (Mangan et al., 2008; Pettit & 
Beresford, 2009; Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2012) and Tesco and Asda have both located large general 
merchandise import centres at the port of Teesport. From a port’s point of view, this allows them 
not only to secure cargo throughput, but to earn additional revenue from these activities on their 
land (Pettit & Beresford, 2009). Import containers are offloaded from ships, shunted to the 
warehouse, stripped, and the empty then returned for repositioning. The load will then be 
reconfigured for inland movement. Potential efficiencies arise as this movement may be direct from 
the port-based DC to the final store, thus removing the inland DC from the chain. 
McKinnon (2009) found that “since 2004, roughly 60% of the demand for large DCs has come 
from retailers” (p. S295). Large firms are reducing the number of their DCs while increasing the 
size and efficiency of those that remain. Fewer, larger DCs means greater centralisation and 
potentially greater miles travelled, but also greater potential for intermodal transport due to 
consolidation on key routes. Food and grocery companies currently contribute one in four of all 
lorry miles travelled in the UK (IGD, 2012). 
 Greater use of information and communications technology (ICT) has allowed more accurate 
forecasting and more responsive ordering (thus a move from push to pull); filling these orders 
without incurring increased transport costs then required a more tightly optimised spatial 
distribution of facilities, as well as greater integration between primary and secondary networks. 
Thus some retailers work with hauliers to optimise their distribution (e.g. reducing empty running 
or reducing inventory holding requirements) or work with suppliers to optimise product flows (e.g. 
forecasting, planning and ordering). The result of these spatial and operational evolutions has been 
increasing integration of operations, ranging from increasingly efficient use of backhauling to the 
implementation of factory gate pricing (FGP), both of which give the retailer greater control over 
primary distribution thus strengthening its negotiating position (Mason et al., 2007; Potter et al., 
2007; Burt & Sparks, 2003; Towill, 2005). 
 This period also saw increased use of 3PLs to handle the growing and increasingly complex 
transport requirements resulting from these developments, as well as more frequent, smaller 
deliveries from suppliers to reduce inventories, which also encouraged suppliers to make use of 
PCCs (Smith & Sparks, 2009; Fernie & McKinnon, 2003). Distribution facilities continued to 
evolve, from single product warehouses to composite environments housing ambient, chilled and 
9 
fresh produce, all scanned in and out using barcodes that were integrated within the IT system used 
for forecasting, planning and ordering (Fernie et al., 2010; Smith & Sparks, 2009). 
 Collaboration with competitors is also a key theme in the literature. The subject of retail 
intermodal logistics includes the retailers themselves as well as rail operators and third-party 
logistics providers (3PLs). Schmoltzi & Wallenburg (2011) found that while almost 60% of 3PLs in 
their study operated at least one horizontal partnership with other 3PLs, the failure rate was below 
19%, against an average failure rate for horizontal collaborations in many industries ranging from 
50% to 70%. The authors also found that, while horizontal collaboration might be thought to be 
based on cost reduction, the primary motivations revealed in their study were service quality 
improvement and market share enhancement. Similarly, Hingley et al., (2011) found that cost 
efficiencies from horizontal collaboration were less important to grocery retailers than retaining 
supply chain control.  
 
3. Conceptual framework 
In a similar study to the present paper, Eng-Larsson & Kohn (2012) constructed a conceptual 
framework linking the contextual factors affecting the modal shift decision, the contextual factors 
affecting intermodal transport quality and the resulting operational changes affecting logistics 
performance (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Conceptual framework relating modal shift decision, intermodal transport quality and 
logistics performance 
(Source: Eng-Larsson & Kohn, 2012) 
 
 
Rather than addressing all three elements of the framework, this paper aims to understand the 
second stage of the model in more detail, where the industry characteristics intersect with the 
quality of the intermodal transport provision. The retail sector in the UK has achieved some 
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successful modal shift, due in part to the spatial concentration and distance outlined in the previous 
section. However, it is not clear how rail operators are matching the service characteristics of road 
haulage to which retailers are accustomed. 
Eng-Larsson & Kohn (2012) added two new aspects to the second part of their model as a result 
of their research: system control and carrier performance. These additions concur with the literature 
review above, where the increasing role of integration (defined as a process whereby the entire 
logistics system is managed as a single entity) and the issues faced by transport providers (within 
the same mode as well as across modes) were noted. The literature review on intermodal transport 
and retail logistics presented in the previous section can now be used to expand the second stage of 
the Eng-Larsson & Kohn (2012) model.  
The key findings from the literature review are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Key findings from the literature review 
Factor Sub-factor Literature 
Operational 
rail issues 
Infrastructure Capacity and high-cube clearance issues are known. 
Equipment Wagon and container imbalances are known. 
Operations 
Known issues with lead time, backhauls, service development 
and general operational complexities compared to road 
transport. 
 
The literature assumes a competitive environment for domestic 
rail. Little discussion of port vs inland flows. 
Price Lack of transparent pricing system. 
Role of government 
in intermodal 
transport 
Government promotes intermodal transport through policy. 
Literature suggests that government funding for intermodal 
transport has been successful. 
Retail 
distribution 
Primary distribution 
Generally managed by suppliers but increasing control by 
retailers. 
Secondary 
distribution 
Generally managed by retailers now. 
Distribution centres 
Rationalisation and centralisation of DCs, larger purpose-built 
composites. 
Consolidation Use of PCCs by suppliers. 
Product & route 
characteristics 
Primarily ambient/grocery products in retail cages moving in 
containers on the Anglo-Scottish route, back hauled by 
suppliers. Long distance route between load centres located in 
the Midlands and central Scotland. 
Horizontal 
integration 
Uncommon among retailers but some evidence that 3PLs are 
increasingly doing so. 
Vertical integration 
Increasingly integrated supply chains but little in the literature 
regarding its role in intermodal transport. 
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While the general characteristics of intermodal transport are known from the literature, they 
have not been considered in direct relation to retailers as their primary users, nor have they been 
examined in a port vs domestic context, both of which have been identified as important topics 
needing addressed (Woodburn, 2012).  
Similarly, the general characteristics of retail distribution, as shown in Table 1, are relatively 
well covered in the literature, being to some degree an expansion of the second stage of the Eng-
Larsson & Kohn (2012) model. The current nature of retail distribution is based on primary and 
secondary distribution strategies linking large composite DCs centralised in the Midlands with 
regional DCs and local stores. These operational characteristics created the potential for 
consolidating flows on the Anglo-Scottish intermodal route.  
 A third significant aspect raised in the literature is that the roles of vertical and horizontal 
integration have been instrumental in linking retailers, 3PLs and rail operators in order to establish 
traffic on these routes. However, unlike operational rail issues and retail distribution, this topic has 
been inadequately covered in the extant literature. In constructing the conceptual framework, 
therefore, this issue has been separated from the general discussion on retail distribution to form its 
own topic. In particular, the role of the 3PL linking the rail operator and the retailer will be 
foregrounded in the framework for this paper, as it is suspected to be the key element, and one that 
has not been addressed sufficiently. 
 The relations between distribution (linking retailers and 3PLs) and intermodal transport (linking 
3PLs and rail operators) are depicted in the conceptual framework (Figure 5). The roles of vertical 
and horizontal integration have been foregrounded as key elements. 
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Figure 5. Conceptual framework linking distribution characteristics, intermodal transport provision 
and the role of integration 
 
 
4. Methodology 
The objective of this study is to understand the key factors relating to the use of intermodal 
transport by retailers, including the role of 3PLs and rail operators. This overall objective has been 
refined through literature review to produce a conceptual framework highlighting the key 
relationships and issues to be addressed. In order to collect and analyse data, the research process 
has been divided into three research questions: 
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1. How do operational issues influence the use of rail by the retail sector? 
2. How does the spatial distribution of retail logistics influence the use of rail transport? 
3. How do strategies of vertical and horizontal integration influence the use of rail transport by 
the retail sector? 
 
The conceptual framework will be used to analyse the data (see Table 6), comparing the findings 
with the expectations from the literature to highlight where expectations have been confirmed and 
where new findings have been established.  
The importance of qualitative context-dependent research in logistics has been raised in 
previous papers (e.g. Näslund, 2002; Aastrup & Halldórsson, 2008), while other writers have 
discussed the need for rigorous case study design (e.g. da Mota Pedrosa et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Seuring, 2008; Spens & Kovács, 2006). In this paper an inductive process has been followed 
to allow conclusions to emerge from the data; however, the research process has been guided by 
using the conceptual framework to collate and reduce data on the key factors and sub-factors 
identified in the literature. This structure also facilitates a comparison between known issues and 
new findings from the UK case. 
The study began with desk research to identify retailers, 3PLs and rail operators involved in 
intermodal transport. The literature was reviewed to highlight the key issues that could then be 
explored in depth during the interviews. Informal scoping interviews were conducted with industry 
stakeholders to confirm these findings and refine the focus of the study before proceeding to the 
interview stage. In this business, a few large players dominate, thus the interviewees are 
representative of their sector, and it can be seen from Table 2 and Table 3 that the majority of 
retailers, 3PLs and rail operators involved in this small market have been interviewed for this study. 
Three retailers were interviewed (Tesco, Sainsbury and The Cooperative), one wholesaler to 
provide a contrast (Costco), three 3PLs (JG Russell, WH Malcolm and Eddie Stobart) and two rail 
operators (DRS and Freightliner). All meetings were with the senior manager directly responsible 
for planning intermodal services. As retail intermodal logistics is a relatively small speciality, only 
few staff from each company are directly involved. In most cases, one interviewee was available, 
and in two cases (Sainsbury and WH Malcolm) two interviewees contributed. 
Interviews lasted approximately three hours and each interviewee was given a copy of the 
interview transcript for approval. The interviews for the study were semi-structured; the interview 
guide was based on the conceptual framework, and was designed to be tailored during use for each 
type of interviewee. Thus some questions took precedence over others depending on the interview 
subject. The research strategy was not based on obtaining opinions on barriers to and opportunities 
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for intermodal transport as these are already known from the literature; rather the research design is 
based on understanding how the structure and operations of the retail business relate to intermodal 
transport. This is why a case study rather than a survey approach was preferred. Therefore data were 
also gathered by desk research, in particular document analysis of industry, government and 
academic literature. 
The first step was to review the interview and documentary data several times. The data were 
then organised and reduced by collating evidence in a matrix based on the conceptual framework, 
according to a three-stage process of data reduction, display and conclusion drawing and 
verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Gaps in the matrix were identified and filled by follow-up 
emails as well as further data collection via desk research. An iterative process was followed, 
moving back and forth between data collection, analysis, interpretation and explanation, making use 
of triangulation where possible to strengthen interpretations. In this way, the data were reduced into 
manageable sections, which then guided the presentation under headings and sub-headings used in 
this paper. A summarised version of the matrix with evidence for each category and sub-category is 
presented in Table 6. 
It is also important not to lose the link to the interview context, as the value of expert interviews 
is that they provide an insight into actual practice, which should not be subsumed beneath overly 
abstract categories. Detailed description is particularly important in revealing different strategies 
across companies. Therefore while the key findings (structured by the research questions and 
conceptual framework factors) have been summarised in tables presented throughout this paper and 
collated in Table 6, they have been supplemented by the inclusion of examples of practice drawn 
from the interviews. Due to commercial sensitivity the detail has been kept fairly general. As an 
important check on the accuracy and representativeness of the results, as well as the validity of the 
interpretation and explanation, all interviewees were given the opportunity to comment on the 
paper. 
 
5. Use of intermodal transport by retailers 
Before addressing the three research questions, the current use of intermodal transport by UK 
retailers must be established. 
Network Rail, a nominally private but government-owned company owns and operates the track 
infrastructure, with intermodal terminals owned or leased by private operators. A number of private 
rail operators compete to run services. There are four primary rail freight operators in the UK: DB 
Schenker (formerly EWS), Freightliner, Direct Rail Services (DRS) and First GBRf. The other main 
players are third-party logistics service providers that charter trains from these operators, including 
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John G Russell, WH Malcolm and Eddie Stobart. There has been a significant growth for 3PLs 
because many customers prefer integrated door-to-door solutions. 
 Table 2 lists all current intermodal rail services on the Anglo-Scottish route (not only those used 
by retailers), divided into two categories: ex port (direct service between a port and a Scottish 
terminal) and domestic (between inland terminals in England and Scotland). Intra-England and 
intra-Scotland services are not shown. The table shows that the majority of domestic container rail 
traffic between Scotland and England uses DIRFT Daventry; currently doing around 175,000 lifts 
per year, it is the busiest inland intermodal terminal in the UK. 
 
 
Table 2. List of current intermodal rail services running on the Anglo-Scottish route  
Type Service Traction Management 
Frequency 
per week 
Ex port 
Felixstowe – Coatbridge Freightliner Freightliner 5 
Southampton – Coatbridge Freightliner Freightliner 5 
Tilbury – Coatbridge Freightliner Freightliner 5 
Liverpool – Coatbridge Freightliner Freightliner 5 
Domestic 
Tilbury-Barking-Daventry-Coatbridge DRS JG Russell 2 daily x 5/6 
Daventry – Mossend (DB Schenker) DB Schenker Stobart 6 
Daventry – Mossend (PD Stirling) DRS WH Malcolm 5 
Daventry – Grangemouth DRS WH Malcolm 6/7 
Hams Hall – Mossend DB Schenker DB Schenker 5 
(Source: author, based on interviews) 
 
 
These intermodal services are all shared user. The ex port services are majority booked by shipping 
lines as carrier haulage is dominant in the UK for port flows, but smaller users can also book space 
on these trains directly with Freightliner or through a 3PL or freight forwarder. The other flows are 
managed by 3PLs serving a variety of customers. The largest sector utilising these trains is the retail 
sector, therefore this paper will focus on these users as instructive of the larger issues at play. In this 
research the focus is primarily on grocery retailers rather than other retail sectors such as fashion, 
and a wholesaler has also been included as a contrast. 
 Woodburn (2003) noted that “it is notoriously difficult to identify specific rail freight users and 
volumes from public sources, particularly in the non-bulk sectors” (p.245). For this paper a list of 
all retailer use of intermodal transport has been compiled by combining the interview data and a 
recent report by the UK Freight Transport Association (FTA, 2012)
1
. Results are presented in Table 
3. 
                                                     
1
 FTA (2012) was published during the course of this research therefore it was not used in the initial research design. 
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Table 3. Use of intermodal transport by large retailers in the UK 
Retailer Route Traction  Management 
Tesco Anglo-Scottish DB Schenker Stobart 
Tesco Scotland to north DRS Stobart 
Tesco Daventry-Tilbury DRS Stobart 
Tesco Daventry-Magor DRS Stobart 
Sainsbury Anglo-Scottish DRS JG Russell 
Morrison Anglo-Scottish DRS JG Russell 
Costco Anglo-Scottish DRS JG Russell 
Waitrose Anglo-Scottish DRS WH Malcolm 
M&S (DHL) Anglo-Scottish DRS WH Malcolm 
Co-operative Anglo-Scottish DRS WH Malcolm 
Asda Anglo-Scottish DRS WH Malcolm 
Asda Scotland to north DRS DRS 
 
 
As noted in the methodology section, the majority of companies from Table 2Error! Reference 
source not found. and Table 3 have been interviewed for this study and will be discussed in 
subsequent sections, but in this section of the paper all retailers will be considered in order to give a 
complete overview of the UK retail intermodal network. 
 Tesco is the only retailer large enough to move significant flows by rail, with four dedicated 
services, matching secondary distribution of picked loads with inbound primary flows, filled out 
with other materials such as packed-down cages and recycling. Tesco transports 32 45ft loads daily 
northbound on the Anglo-Scottish corridor, while their new service to Wales takes 34 45ft boxes, 
and their service to the north of Scotland and the one from Tilbury take 22 containers each. Asda 
(not interviewed for this study) is the only company that gets close, with 20 loads on the Anglo-
Scottish route and 10 going to Aberdeen. Tesco is about to start moving up to 20 loads daily on the 
Aberdeen route, as well as planning some more potential services in collaboration with DRS, only 
one of which is likely to be a dedicated service. With the additional Tesco volume, the Aberdeen 
service is now fully utilised and is about to extend to 7-day operation. In fact, DRS has noted that 
they have received additional interest from retailers due to the visible success of their Tesco trains. 
Wholesaler Costco is the only other significant user of rail transport, sending 10-15 containers 
daily on the JG Russell service to Scotland. They used to send the Aberdeen deliveries on this train 
(just to Coatbridge then by lorry to Aberdeen), but because of the timings it was found to be quicker 
to use road. The train arrives early enough to suit the central belt stores but there would not be 
enough time to drive it up to the Aberdeen store.  
Other users only contribute very small numbers of containers to the shared user Anglo-Scottish 
services. Sainsbury has been using rail on some primary hauls to bring product of Scottish suppliers 
to their Midlands DCs, using the shared JG Russell service (although management of this flow has 
recently returned to the supplier). Morrisons use the JG Russell service in the opposite direction to 
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move loads of picked pallets from Northampton to Bellshill. In the past, they have trialled services 
between Trafford Park and Glasgow, and Coatbridge to Inverness. Waitrose uses the WH Malcolm 
Anglo-Scottish service, as does DHL for M&S. M&S is building its own rail-connected DC at 
Castle Donington (see below for discussion). The Co-operative is currently running a trial on the 
WH Malcolm Anglo-Scottish service, taking 2 containers per night, 5 nights per week from the 
Midlands to their Scottish DC at Newhouse.  
 
6. Operational issues influencing the use of rail by retailers 
6.1 General issues 
All rail users interviewed for this paper stated that their use of rail had been extremely reliable. 
In fact, rail had proved more reliable than road during the hard winter in 2010/11. As shippers gain 
experience using rail, they know that they can contact a freight forwarder or rail operator and put 
even a single container on a timetabled rail service. However, to achieve this position (and extend 
it) has required and will require work on behalf of 3PLs who can provide a door-to-door solution to 
customers, providing the responsiveness of a road haulier. 
 The common opinion from the interviews was that Network Rail is very good to work with, but 
more effort is needed in areas such as path flexibility. For example, not all paths are utilised but 
incumbent operators are loath to give them up, and need only run a train once a year to retain the 
path. Some of these could be freed up, and it has also been suggested that some paths are in reality a 
higher gauge than listed, and this could be cleared up with only some paperwork and a trial run. 
One interviewee said that they have had to pay double for a terminal to open on a Sunday, so 
increased Sunday operations would be welcomed by retailers. Night time deliveries to stores would 
also help, and the London Olympics may open the door for that to be tested.  
 Government grants (Freight Facilities Grant [FFG] for infrastructure and Modal Shift Revenue 
Support [MSRS] for operating subsidies) have been instrumental in supporting the shift of retail 
(and other) flows from road to rail. Most intermodal terminals in the UK have benefited from FFG 
funding at one time or another, and the funding has supported intermodal development in other 
ways, such as subsidising the construction of the Tesco/Stobart rail containers. Interviewees were 
all supportive of the government grants and critical of their reduction and/or removal,
2
 although 
there were some concerns that the FFG system could have been used more strategically and that the 
process deterred some projects that might have been successful. Economic and operational realities 
of the freight business can make it difficult to use this funding strategically (e.g. by using the 
planning system to designate strategic terminals via a top-down process rather than relying on ad 
hoc funding applications). In terms of other government incentives, while interviewees considered it 
                                                     
2
 FFGs have now been scrapped in England and Wales and significantly reduced in Scotland. 
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unfeasible to enforce use of rail, the possibility that the Department for Transport (DfT) could in 
future allow overweight trucks between DCs and intermodal terminals was felt to be more realistic. 
Table 4 shows that the key players mentioned in this paper have received significant operational 
funding for their intermodal services. 
 
Table 4. Recipients of operating subsidies through MSRS intermodal 2010/11 
Recipient Transport 
Scotland 
DfT Total 
DB Schenker  £33,994 £192,749 £226,743 
Direct Rail Services  £310,676 £678,817 £989,493 
Eddie Stobart  £308,113 £328,209 £636,322 
Freightliner  £27,977 £56,190 £84,167 
JG Russell  £136,157 £752,158 £888,315 
Total £816,917 £2,008,123 £2,825,040 
(Source: author, compiled from government sources) 
 
The economic competitiveness of rail must be improved to reduce the requirement for these 
operational subsidies, but a number of operational problems were raised in both the literature and 
the case analysis.  
The interviewees in this study claimed that asset utilisation is more important than break-even 
distance, even if made up by a number of short distance services. One interviewee said to “beware 
of management accountants” because they look at the individual costs of running a train, without 
considering factors such as utilisation and cross subsidy across their service portfolio. Most freight 
trains run at night due to path restrictions during the day, with the result that a locomotive and 
wagon set may sit idle all day. Daytime running is generally possible in Scotland because the lines 
are not as busy but this is difficult in England. The view of rail operators in interviews conducted 
for this paper is that if you can keep a train running most of the day then it will make money, so if a 
train is just sitting idle in a siding then any service, no matter how short, is worth running. 
 Handling charges necessitated by changing modes have always been a barrier to greater use of 
intermodal transport, and the lack of visibility of the true cost of rail movements was noted in the 
literature review. It was suggested by one retailer that the quote they are given is simply based on 
being “slightly cheaper than road” rather than being based on the actual costs of providing the 
service; they would like greater visibility of the cost to the provider of the entire rail service, 
including the trunk haul. This is similar to the greater control over primary distribution sought 
through use of factory gate pricing. It is a way of removing the need for the retailer to pay a profit 
margin on top of the base cost of the transport service. Retailers have been able to make intermodal 
transport more affordable by bargaining the handling price down, but rail operators feel that they 
cannot go any further or they will not be able to provide the service.  
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 Obtaining flows in both directions is often the key issue in making intermodal transport 
economically competitive with road. By integrating their primary and secondary distribution, Tesco 
has been able to match supplier deliveries inbound to their Daventry NDC with outbound 
distribution to RDCs. For example, they sell space on their dedicated trains to their suppliers, thus 
inserting themselves in a chain of vertical cooperation that draws the rail operator, 3PL and supplier 
together. JG Russell matches flows on rail by sending French wine to Daventry, then the Costco 
loads to Scotland, then returning from Scotland to the continent with whisky. 
 More backhauls from Scotland to England are needed to support the Anglo-Scottish services. 
The feeling from the interviewees is that the loads are there; “it is just a matter of making it work,” 
sometimes just convincing a company that has not used rail before to give it a try. 3PLs feel that 
there are many companies with a few containers a day that could use rail, or that may require 
consolidation of less than container loads (LCL) before sending them south by rail. Therefore 
consolidation could be a key issue to promote further use of intermodal transport and integrate road 
and rail more seamlessly.  
 Road operations also need to be understood in order to contribute to supporting the growth of 
intermodal transport. Road haulage is built into supply chains because of its inherent flexibility, for 
instance the ability to stagger deliveries. If 30 containers arrived together it could be difficult to 
handle. “Staggered delivery is easier to manage,” one retailer said.  
 
6.2 Wagons, containers and retail cages 
Retail movements to stores are generally done in cages, and greater economies can be achieved 
by transporting these in double-deck lorries, which are almost unique to the UK (McKinnon, 2010). 
A standard lorry takes 45 retail cages, as does a 45ft rail container, whereas a double-deck lorry can 
take 72 cages. As confirmed by a retailer in an interview: “because we run double-deck road 
trailers, it is difficult for the rail operators to compete on price.” Double-deck lorries currently form 
about 20% of the Tesco fleet. That might eventually get up to around 40-50% but according to the 
interviewee it will never be 100% because of operational reasons.  
Most domestic intermodal containers used by 3PLs such as Stobart, WH Malcolm and JG 
Russell are 45ft “pallet-wide”, which allows them to carry the same pallet loading (UK or Euro) as 
a road trailer. However, their design differs across companies. The Stobart/Tesco containers are 
curtain siders, which is common on lorries but not on trains. As trains are often required to stop on 
the line, they can be targets for pilferage, therefore generally rigid boxes are preferred. Similarly, 
curtain siders, like swap bodies, cannot be stacked as standard maritime boxes can. Another 
difference between road trailers and rail containers is that HGVs can be compartmentalised for 
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chilled, frozen and ambient but current rail containers cannot, which limits their flexibility. All of 
these operational issues contribute to the decision to use rail (or not). 
 It was found in the research that containers designed for purely domestic flows (e.g. the Tesco 
rail containers designed in conjunction with Stobart Rail) are more likely to be standard 8ft6 height 
to avoid the loading gauge problem on the UK network. Taking high-cube containers on non-gauge-
cleared routes means using special wagons such as Megafrets and Lowliners, which are more 
expensive to buy and to maintain. Similarly, these wagons are generally 54ft and carry 45ft 
domestic boxes, meaning 9ft of length is wasted per wagon. This is now being addressed by new 
low wagons that are 45ft long. 
 It will be seen in the discussion of primary and secondary distribution that a large retailer like 
Tesco managing both legs allows them to match flows to increase the economic viability of a 
service. However, this approach is threatened by the acute container imbalance on the Anglo-
Scottish route, as depicted in Figure 2. Interviews revealed that this container mismatch also affects 
wagon configurations, for example sometimes 45ft domestic containers are carried on 60ft wagons 
designed for 20ft/40ft deepsea container combinations. This equipment mismatch is also a problem 
in countries such as the United States where 40ft deepsea boxes are transloaded into 53ft domestic 
containers. However 53ft maritime containers are now being constructed in China, so this may soon 
come to influence global standards. 
Interviews revealed that industry discussions have taken place with regard to the possibility of a 
joint action between retailers (northbound 45ft boxes) and whisky producers (southbound 20ft/40ft 
boxes). If either one or the other were to use the same type of container and transload the contents at 
one end, the problem could be resolved, as long as the savings made from matching the flows 
outweigh the cost of transloading. However, distillers do not want their high value cargo to be 
handled any more than is necessary, and retailers have no motivation to inconvenience their 
operations in order to reduce the repositioning costs paid by Scottish shippers. 
 
7. The influence of distribution patterns on the use of rail 
7.1 Primary distribution 
Inbound flows into the DC can come from overseas through ports, the channel tunnel or by air, 
or they can come from within the UK. While the primary focus of this paper is on domestic 
intermodal transport of grocery products, some discussion of imports through ports is required in 
order to demonstrate how intermodal transport is based on both port and domestic flows. This 
mixture causes problems with matching directional imbalances but also raises complications with 
different wagon and container types, as discussed in the next section. Generally, port flows are non-
food lines such as clothes or electronics from the Far East moving through UK deepsea ports such 
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as Felixstowe and Southampton. Tesco is the largest retailer and imports roughly 20,000 containers 
per year from the Far East through these two ports. This translates to about 400 loads per week. 
 Not all retailers have the resources or the desire to manage primary distribution, as there are 
pros and cons to managing it in-house, sub-contracting to one or more firms or leaving it to 
suppliers. For example, Sainsbury manages about 90% of their inbound fresh produce, 60% of 
chilled and 10% of ambient/grocery, whereas Tesco has a larger focus on primary distribution, with 
60% of ambient/grocery and 70% of fresh produce moving through their primary network. Tesco’s 
high level of control of primary ambient flows enables them to put this supplier traffic on rail, 
providing backhaul flows south to the Midlands to balance the northbound secondary movements.  
 These decisions are different for different companies, thus a wholesaler like Costco has a 
simpler model. They only have about 3,200 stock-keeping units (SKUs), so this is very different to 
a supermarket retailer, as it allows Costco to maintain a far simpler operation. All primary flows are 
delivered as full container loads (FCL) and managed by the suppliers; moreover, all value-added 
work is pushed upstream as supply chain management is not the core competency of Costco. 
 The role of shipping lines should also be considered. The UK is unusual in Europe in having a 
high proportion of carrier haulage (about 70%), which means that the shipping lines control 
distribution from the port to the inland destination. When this is done by rail, it is usually with 
Freightliner on their ex port services, although DB Schenker has been competing successfully in 
this market. As carrier haulage gives less control to the retailers, this is one area in which a large 
company like Tesco, with growing experience at managing their primary network, can negotiate 
port-only prices and manage the inland leg themselves. The flows that they currently manage in this 
way are going by road, but their next step is to shift some of these flows (mostly 
Felixstowe/Southampton to Daventry) to rail. 
 
7.2 Secondary distribution 
Movements from DCs to stores are more likely to be managed in-house by the retailer or sub-
contracted on a closer relationship. Tesco, Sainsbury and the Co-operative all run their own trucks 
for secondary distribution but will sub-contract occasionally where required, as well as some of the 
retail lorry fleet being operated by third parties on an open-book basis (see Table 5). A large 
supermarket would have on average about 5-6 trucks delivering per day (obviously this depends on 
a number of factors such as use of double-deck lorries).  
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Table 5. Distribution structure of each company 
Company Sector Manage primary 
distribution 
Manage secondary distribution DCs 
Tesco Retailer Partial – high Yes 24 
Sainsbury Retailer Partial - med Yes, but about 50% on third 
party open-book basis 
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The Cooperative Retailer No Yes 16 
Costco Wholesaler No Yes 1 
 
 
Whether secondary flows are suitable for rail will depend to a large degree on the distribution 
strategy of the retailer, for example which product lines are stored at the regional distribution centre 
(RDC) and which require trunking from the national distribution centre (NDC). For example, when 
Tesco moves containers by rail from Daventry to Livingston, each container is designated for a 
specific store, with the relevant cages from Daventry inside. At Livingston they add additional 
cages to the container, then send it by truck to the store. This is done in the trunking station which is 
all cross-docked. The Stobart Tesco train to Inverness also takes boxes for specific stores, but rather 
than being a DC to DC move, these boxes are trucked direct from the terminal to stores by JG 
Russell. 
Opened in 2007, Tesco’s large 1 million square foot DC at Livingston is the only Tesco DC that 
has fresh, grocery, frozen, trunking and recycling all within the same facility. It sends around 4.5 
million cases weekly to about 250 stores across Scotland, north England and Northern Ireland. 
There are 7,500 SKUs in the grocery part of Livingston DC alone. Tesco monitors which lines 
should be picked at Daventry and trunked to Livingston and which should be stored there. It 
changes as different lines rise and fall in sales, however, all fresh food in Scotland moves through 
Livingston. On an average day the Livingston DC has around 900 trucks coming in and out, but this 
is an unusually large site. 
 Lead time is crucially important for all movements between DCs and stores. According to 
interviewees, an ideal scenario would involve overnight picking and morning departure from the 
DC to reach the store by mid-afternoon, but this cannot always be done because of passenger trains 
on the line during the day. Unless this can be resolved, intermodal growth will be constrained by 
operating mostly at night, which requires stores to order from DCs in the morning so that the load 
can be picked in the afternoon, loaded at the DC at say 1600 to catch a 2000 departure on the train, 
which will then arrive at its destination in the early morning (say 0400-0500) for trucking to the 
store. 
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7.3 Centralisation and other models 
The geographical coverage of distribution facilities is being rationalised by the leading retailers 
to improve the efficiency of their supply chains; however, legacy issues determine to a large extent 
where the DCs are located, meaning that they do not begin today with a blank map. Most retailers 
prefer a centralised model but other models have some potential, such as port-centric logistics and 
continental hubs. 
Both Asda and Tesco have recently opened distribution centres to deal with imports at the port 
of Teesport in the northeast of the UK. Interviews revealed that Tesco does not currently ship 
anything through this port, instead bringing containers from the ports of Felixstowe and 
Southampton, which indicates that even with port-centric strategies, centralisation tendencies are 
very hard to overcome. This could be because Tesco has fewer stores in the northeast than Asda so 
the port-centric strategy was not suitable to their store coverage. 
Interviewees questioned the operational aspects of port-centric logistics, and it was suggested 
that backhaul and container type issues may be difficult to overcome. If the DC is in the port then 
imports arrive in maritime containers, are emptied in the DC then the empty goes back to the 
shipping line. The goods are then distributed from the DC to the stores in 45ft lorries, but the only 
lorries coming to the port will be bringing maritime containers, so it can be difficult to match these 
flows. The result could be empty lorries coming to the DC. Another downside is that the company 
is anchored at that port with little option if a shipping line raises its prices or moves to another port.  
 Another option is to make use of a continental hub to consolidate flows then bring them to the 
UK by rail or ferry. Tesco/Stobarts work with 2XL in Zeebrugge to consolidate loads there (Red 
Bull for example). Similarly, French wine used to come in full loads but now Tesco de-stuffs them 
at Zeebrugge and consolidates many different loads into one container which can then go direct to 
the store in the UK. This means they also reduce their inventory from six weeks down to one week. 
There are difficulties in this model, however. The Channel Tunnel rates are considered by some 
interviewees to be high, part-load patterns are complex, and the ferry also has constraints such as 
time, frequency and imbalance of flows.  
 
8. Strategies of integration influencing the use of rail transport 
8.1 Vertical 
Both vertical and horizontal integration can be observed in the industry, however it is the former 
that is having the greatest impact. Most noticeable is the relationship between retailer Tesco, 
logistics provider Stobart and rail operator DRS. Working closely together has allowed all parties to 
develop knowledge of requirements and adjust operations to suit as they plan new services and 
solve operational issues as they arise.  
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 Vertical integration between all levels of rail operations (from terminal operation, traction 
provision, train management and road haulage) presents an interesting dynamic. Terminals can be 
run by rail operators (e.g. Freightliner or DB Schenker), 3PLs (e.g. WH Malcolm) or other 
companies (e.g. ABP at Hams Hall), or even be private sidings for which the operation is sub-
contracted (e.g. Stobart operating the Tesco siding at DIRFT). Likewise, the customer side of trains 
is normally managed by a 3PL rather than the rail operator (e.g. JG Russell, WH Malcolm and 
Stobart operating trains with traction provided by DRS or DB Schenker), but for other trains the 
management is also done by the rail operator (e.g. Freightliner or DB Schenker). Therefore various 
levels of vertical integration exist depending on the particular service.  
Considering international collaboration, Stobart Rail runs a weekly train during the winter 
carrying fruit from Valencia in Spain in thirty 45ft refrigerated containers through France and the 
Channel Tunnel into the JG Russell terminal at Barking. The goal is to grow to 2-3 services per 
week, which would ensure better asset utilisation, making the service more economic. That is the 
basis on which they applied for Marco Polo funding because to get that funding the service needs to 
be feasible within 3 years. However operational issues on the journey through France (this leg 
operated by SNCF) has resulted in late arrivals, threatening the viability of the service.  
 
8.2 Horizontal 
Retailers do not currently share space within containers, but their containers travel together on 
multi-user 3PL trains as noted earlier. 3PLs also share space on their services, usually on an ad hoc 
basis, but as ex-port services are mostly run by Freightliner who specialises in these flows, 3PLs 
will buy space on those trains (e.g. Stobart bringing boxes from Tilbury to their hub at Widnes). 
3PLs can collaborate in other ways, for example, Stobart runs the Tesco train from Mossend to 
Inverness, where it terminates at the JG Russell terminal, from which point JG Russell distributes 
the containers to stores by road. However, while 3PLs will share spare on each other’s services 
when needed, they do not actually run any regular services together.  
  At the present time, Tesco is the only retailer large enough to fill a complete train. However, 
the decision is whether to operate a dedicated service, in which case the retailer pays for the whole 
train and therefore must take responsibility for filling any empty wagons or suffer a financial 
penalty. Scheduled services may be used by any shippers, but having a dedicated train grants more 
control over the timings and operation of the service. Establishing a dedicated Tesco train rather 
than just buying space on a third-party service gives them more control and enables them to plan the 
primary and secondary distribution as part of a unified system.  
 The retail interviews revealed that in an ideal scenario they would all prefer to have their own 
rail-connected sheds rather than using a shared terminal to load a multi-user train. This practice 
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would require a full trainload per user, reducing opportunities for collaboration. The new DIRFT 3 
appears to be planned around this model of more rail-connected sheds. Similarly, the new DC being 
built by M&S at Castle Donington is rail-connected, but without the retailer being able to provide 
enough volume for regular services, this development will make asset utilisation more difficult for 
rail operators. It can only work if an operator (or someone else) can provide more rail flows to this 
terminal to get better utilisation of the rolling stock. 
 
9. Applying the conceptual framework 
Following Miles & Huberman (1994), Table 6 uses a meta-matrix to analyse the key factors 
from the conceptual framework. The table summarises the expectations from the literature review 
(drawing on Table 1) and compares them with the findings from the UK case, highlighting where 
expectations have been confirmed and where new findings have been established. 
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Table 6. Meta-matrix applying the conceptual framework to the data 
Factor Sub-factor Literature Findings 
Operational 
rail issues 
Infrastructure 
Capacity and high-cube 
clearance issues are 
known. 
This was confirmed. Government investment is ongoing 
but daytime capacity issues will not be resolved. 
Equipment 
 
Wagon and container 
imbalances are known. 
This was confirmed, although greater detail was 
established regarding the relations of Scottish exports 
(20/40ft), northbound retail flows (45ft pallet-wide) and 
intra-European containers (45ft pallet-wide), as well as 
wagon configurations (60ft/54ft/45ft). Another particular 
issue for retailers is the use of cages which suits double-
deck lorries. 
Operations 
 
Known issues with lead 
time, backhauls, service 
development and 
general operational 
complexities compared 
to road transport. 
 
The literature assumes a 
competitive 
environment for 
domestic rail. 
 
Little discussion of port 
vs inland flows. 
Generally confirmed, but, contrary to the common 
approach in the literature, the importance of asset 
utilisation rather than simple breakeven distance was 
raised in the interviews. 
 
A new finding was that the image of rail amongst users 
has improved and all shippers in this research said they 
were happy with the reliability of rail. 
 
All but one service on the Anglo-Scottish route used by 
retailers is provided by one rail operator (although other 
intermodal services exist), so less “on-rail” competition 
than was thought. A separation between port and 
domestic flows (also linked to equipment issues) was 
found, which constrains the wider economic feasibility of 
rail. 
Price 
Lack of transparent 
pricing system. 
This was confirmed, with more detail on the issue. Some 
shippers say that they would like greater visibility of the 
cost to the provider of the entire rail service, including 
the trunk haul, so that they know what the prices are 
based on. 
Role of 
government in 
intermodal 
transport 
 
Government promotes 
intermodal transport 
through policy. 
Literature suggests that 
government funding for 
intermodal transport has 
been successful. 
The role of government was considered more in terms of 
infrastructure upgrades than direct intervention in 
operations.  
 
Planning consent for more single-user sites could split 
scale economies, but shippers prefer their own 
connections rather than sharing either trains or terminals.  
 
Confirmed that government grants have been 
instrumental in supporting the shift from road to rail, 
although some concerns that the FFG system could have 
been used more strategically. 
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Retail 
distribution 
Primary 
distribution 
Generally managed by 
suppliers but increasing 
control by retailers. 
This was confirmed. Only one retailer (Tesco) is engaged 
in FGP. 
Secondary 
distribution 
Generally managed by 
retailers now. 
This was confirmed. 
Distribution 
centres 
Rationalisation and 
centralisation of DCs, 
larger purpose-built 
composites. 
This was confirmed. Additional point of relevance is that 
very few have rail connections. 
 
Some uses of port-centric logistics and continental hubs 
were revealed, but the latter is mostly for some niche 
products like wine, whereas the former has operational 
limitations. 
Consolidation 
Use of PCCs by 
suppliers. 
This was confirmed, but the new finding was the lack of 
appetite for third-party consolidation in secondary 
distribution, which relates to the lack of horizontal 
integration observed. 3PLs seem more focused on 
solving operational issues while retailers are more 
concerned with managing their own business rather than 
altering it to suit larger collaborative interests such as 
intermodal transport requires. 
Product & 
route 
characteristics 
Primarily 
ambient/grocery 
products in retail cages 
moving in containers on 
the Anglo-Scottish 
route, back hauled by 
suppliers. Long distance 
route between load 
centres located in the 
Midlands and central 
Scotland. 
This was confirmed, but the role of port flows was noted. 
Palletised (and sometimes break bulk) general 
merchandise in 20/40ft deepsea containers vs domestic 
ambient in 45ft pallet-wide containers. 
 
Different product characteristics (e.g. grocery focus on 
domestic links vs general merchandise on port links) 
affect the ability to manage intermodal transport 
efficiently. 
 
Logistics decisions take precedence over transport. Even 
Tesco, the leader in intermodal use, built their Scottish 
DC at Livingston right next to a rail line but did not build 
a rail connection. 
Integration  
Horizontal 
Uncommon among 
retailers but some 
evidence that 3PLs are 
increasingly doing so. 
This was confirmed. This could be a significant barrier to 
greater use of intermodal transport. 
Vertical 
Increasingly integrated 
supply chains but little 
in the literature 
regarding its role in 
intermodal transport. 
Vertical integration is more common than horizontal, as 
it is necessary in the modern complicated logistics and 
transport environment. Thus it is Tesco/Stobart/DRS 
collaborating the most because they are the main 
intermodal configuration. 3PLs are becoming 
increasingly important to intermodal transport. 
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10. Discussion 
Many of the findings from the British case corroborate the previous research discussed in the 
literature review. However, the case has added new knowledge which is relevant not only to the UK 
retail sector but also to comparable market sectors within the UK as well as other regions with 
similar market and geographical characteristics, such as continental Europe. 
The examination of the rail industry revealed that the intermodal market is growing, but while 
healthy competition is observed between three 3PLs, traction for all but one of the services is 
provided by one operator, confirming suggestions in the literature that it is not an easy market to 
enter. There is only one retailer (Tesco) with significant volume, although Asda is making efforts 
with both rail services and their port-centric import centre, due partly to their greater concentration 
of stores in the northeast.  
 The key flow is ambient grocery on the Anglo-Scottish route though non-food port flows are 
relevant, for example Tesco seeking to replace carrier haulage with their own primary network. 
Intermodal terminals for these flows in England and Scotland were identified along with current 
service provision. It was found that government funding has been essential in upgrading freight 
handling facilities at many UK intermodal terminals, and that annual operational subsidies of £2.8m 
underpin the services discussed in this paper.  
 From an operational perspective, it was found that asset utilisation is key for rail operators as 
expensive assets are forced to remain idle while daytime paths are used by passenger trains. This 
also relates to the lack of horizontal cooperation between retailers in terms of providing enough 
flows for each train. Other known operational issues such as wagon and container management play 
crucial roles; it was seen in this case how the container imbalance on the Anglo-Scottish corridor 
increases the difficulty of sourcing backhauls which are essential to the economic viability of these 
services. This imbalance in both flows and equipment is exacerbated by the lack of coordination 
between domestic and port movements. While these flows may be managed by different parts of the 
retail organisation (e.g. grocery focus on domestic flows and general merchandise for port flows), 
intermodal transport efficiency requires that they be considered together. 
Analysis of the spatial development of the retail sector confirmed the centralisation of DCs 
identified in the literature. There are some potential drivers for decentralisation, such as port-centric 
logistics and continental hubs, but the analysis in this paper has suggested that they have only 
limited potential. Centralisation has facilitated trunk hauls between NDCs and DCs, thus being a 
key reason behind the success of retail intermodal logistics, however different practices have been 
observed in the present research. For example, sending a full container from Midlands NDC to 
Scottish rail terminal and direct to store (e.g. the Cooperative) is different to sending a partially-full 
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container from the NDC to the Scottish DC where further cages are added in the trunking station, 
and thence to the store (e.g. Tesco). 
 The literature suggested increasing integration between actors but was unclear on the extent and 
the process by which it is done. Horizontal integration is important to achieve full trains, and while 
the results showed that this is happening now between 3PLs, it is not happening with retailers. 
Findings from this case raise the issue of retailers preferring private sidings rather than shared-user 
terminals, which splits economies of scale and can be a barrier to greater use of intermodal 
transport. Public planners might consider whether multi-user platforms should be preferred in the 
planning system rather than more rail-connected sheds. Vertical integration is more common than 
horizontal, as was to be expected, as actors see that this is an important element in making 
intermodal transport work. 
 By studying the role of 3PLs as well as retailers, this paper has demonstrated the value of taking 
a broader approach to the support of intermodal service development. For example, 3PLs raised the 
importance of consolidation centres for converting LCL into FCL which can feed intermodal 
services if they are located at intermodal hubs, in particular southbound flows on the Anglo-Scottish 
route to provide backhauls for northbound retail flows. They can also be used for retailers de-
stuffing containers and consolidating loads for regional stores. This could also be considered by 
public planners. 
In the interviews, 3PLs seemed confident that intermodal use will increase, but while retailers 
are positive about intermodal, actions show that it remains a minority interest. Indeed, it was 
unclear to what degree a company’s interest in using rail is due to a shift in the sector or a 
purposeful management policy or whether it is just down to an individual in a company. Therefore 
it is difficult to drive this through policy when it often comes down to individuals, meetings and 
discussions between 3PL or rail personnel and the potential client, built on individual relationships. 
The role of the individual decision maker within an organisation could be a subject for future 
research. 
 Future drivers of rail growth include fuel price rises, carbon targets and increasing road 
congestion, particularly in areas where the road is poor. Fuel price is certainly an issue, as some 
operators update their costs on their contract weekly due to changing fuel costs. Congestion is less 
of an issue at the moment but will not go away, and corporate social responsibility has grown in 
importance, according at least to company reports and promotional literature (Jones et al., 2005). 
While the green agenda may have fallen slightly in prominence due to the recession, it remains a 
key driver, according to interviewees. 
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11. Conclusion 
While the relationship between distribution geography and rail operations discussed in this 
paper was based on retailers, many of these features are observed in other industry sectors, so these 
findings can be applied in other market contexts. Many of these operational issues, observed in both 
the literature and the present research, have no sign of a solution, such as short distances, 
fragmented flows, backhaul sourcing, reluctance to share trains, container imbalances and lack of 
day time paths limiting lead times and asset utilisation. Ongoing public subsidy is still provided, 
which could be removed at any point. Thus even the most successful users of intermodal transport 
have made only small advances towards solving the perennial problems identified in the literature.  
A key outcome of this paper that can be applied in other contexts arises from the conceptual 
framework used in this research, which included retailers, 3PLs and rail operators as they all 
combine to produce successful retail intermodal logistics. Rail operation in the UK is competitive 
but as one provider has become more experienced and built better relationships with retailers and 
3PLs, this one provider now dominates and entering this market will be difficult for others. From a 
retailer perspective, only one large retailer is directly involved in intermodal logistics, while the 
others only participate through the use of 3PLs. Thus the 3PL is the main player in retail intermodal 
logistics in the UK, with high competition between three providers, all of which have been 
successful in attracting and aggregating small flows. The potential role of the 3PL in supporting 
intermodal transport is a finding that can be explored in other contexts, and is of particular 
relevance to transport planners. 
 While government funding in the past has supported both single-user and multi-user intermodal 
terminals, new developments include private sidings to support retailer preference; this approach 
may have limited success because it does not sufficiently incorporate the role of the 3PLs. The 
operational constraints discussed above require the 3PL to provide a necessary bridge between the 
retailer and the rail operator. 3PLs require the prioritisation of consolidation centres and multi-user 
terminals, supporting the aggregation that underpins the financial viability of rail transport. This 
limitation in the current system can be addressed in future research, as well as being translated to 
other market and geographical contexts and informing government approaches to the support of 
intermodal transport. 
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